Journal of Monetary Economics · 2023 · Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond、Andreas Hornstein Z、Marios Karabarbounis、Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond、André Kurmann、Étienne Lalé
中文摘要
失业保险 (UI) 既抑制劳动供给，又构成需求刺激，这或许可以解释为何实证研究常常发现 UI 对就业的影响有限。本文对负激励效应进行了独立估计，该效应源于美国历史上规模最大的 UI 扩张——疫情失业津贴。利用来自 Homebase 的小型餐馆和零售商的高频数据，我们通过比较基本共享 UI 刺激正向影响的相邻企业来控制本地需求效应。我们发现，在疫情期 UI 待遇相对慷慨程度差异较大的劳动力市场上，低工资企业的就业复苏慢于高工资企业的就业复苏。根据一个能够复现低工资与高工资企业之间就业差异估计值的劳动搜寻模型，疫情 UI 项目的负激励效应在 2020 年 4 月至 12 月间使总体就业复苏放缓了 4.7 个百分点。
Abstract
Unemployment insurance (UI) acts both as a disincentive for labor supply and as a demand stimulus which may explain why empirical studies often find limited effects of UI on employment.This paper provides independent estimates of the disincentive effects arising from the largest expansion of UI in U.S. history, the pandemic unemployment benefits.Using high-frequency data on small restaurants and retailers from Homebase, we control for local demand effects by comparing neighboring businesses that largely share the positive impact of UI stimulus.We find that employment in low-wage businesses recovered more slowly than employment in high-wage businesses in labor markets with larger differences in the relative generosity of pandemic UI benefits.According to a labor search model that replicates the estimated employment differences between low-and high-wage businesses, the disincentive effects from the pandemic UI programs held back the aggregate employment recovery by 4.7 percentage points between April and December 2020.