中文摘要
本文构建了一个一般均衡框架,以考察由支付数据衍生出的总需求信息对福利的影响。当利率较低时,披露此类信息往往会改善总体福利;而当利率较高时,则可能降低福利。如果中央银行控制信息披露,它可以通过一种贝叶斯说服的形式设计带噪声的信息,以鼓励投资并改善福利。如果信息改由私人银行生产并在竞争性市场上交易,则可能出现信息过度生产。最后,对隐私的担忧可能使部分消费者不愿使用数字支付,从而降低总需求信息的精确度,但这未必会减少福利。
Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium framework to examine the welfare implications of aggregate-demand information derived from payment data. The disclosure of such information tends to improve aggregate welfare when interest rates are low but may reduce welfare when rates are high. If a central bank controls information disclosure, it can craft noisy messages that encourage investment and benefit welfare through a form of Bayesian persuasion. If the information is instead produced by private banks and traded in a competitive market, excessive information production may happen. Finally, privacy concerns may dissuade some consumers from using digital payments, thereby decreasing the precision of aggregate-demand information, but it need not reduce welfare.