International Economic Review · 2025 · Doh‐Shin Jeon、Yassine Lefouili、Leonardo Madio
中文摘要
本文研究平台下架侵犯知识产权产品的激励,以及令平台对此类侵权承担责任对创新与福利的影响。我们首先表明,平台责任可能导致佣金率上升或下降,这取决于筛查如何影响交易量。我们随后表明,平台责任既可能促进也可能阻碍创新,这取决于跨组网络外部性的强度,该强度决定了每一边的参与弹性。如果平台责任降低了创新,那么所有市场参与者——平台、创新者、模仿者和买家——的境况都会变差。我们还给出了平台责任提高福利的一个充分条件。
Abstract
ABSTRACT We study a platform's incentives to remove IP‐infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for such infringements on innovation and welfare. We first show that platform liability can lead to either higher or lower commission rates, depending on how screening affects transaction volume. We then show that liability may spur or hinder innovation, depending on the intensity of cross‐group network externalities, which determines participation elasticities on each side. If platform liability lowers innovation, all market participants—the platform, innovators, imitators, and buyers—are worse off. We also provide a sufficient condition for platform liability to raise welfare.