Quantitative Economics · 2026 · Richard W. Blundell、Ran Gu、Søren Leth‐Petersen、Hamish W. Low、Costas Meghir
中文摘要
汽车质量的私人信息意味着售价反映的是所售汽车的平均质量，而这一平均质量可能低于总体中的平均质量。这一差额即是对高质量汽车持有者所施加的柠檬惩罚。我们利用丹麦关于汽车保有、收入与财富的关联登记数据，构建一个包含私人信息的汽车保有均衡模型，估计柠檬惩罚的演变。我们考察这些惩罚的总体影响与分配后果。我们估计，在保有汽车的第一年，柠檬惩罚为价格的12%。该惩罚随保有时间的延长而急剧下降。它降低了汽车的自我保险价值，并导致交易量和汽车周转率的大幅下降。市场并未崩溃：收入冲击促使家庭出售其汽车，即便这些汽车质量良好，而这有助于缓解柠檬问题。当经济中的收入不确定性上升以及信贷供给减少时，柠檬惩罚的规模会下降。
Abstract
Private information on car quality means the sale price reflects the average quality of cars sold, which can be lower than the average quality in the population. This difference is the lemons penalty imposed on holders of high‐quality cars. We estimate the evolution of the lemons penalty through an equilibrium model of car ownership with private information using Danish linked registry data on car ownership, income, and wealth. We examine the aggregate implications and distributional consequences of these penalties. In the first year of ownership, we estimate that the lemons penalty is 12% of the price. The penalty declines sharply with the length of ownership. It reduces the self‐insurance value of cars and leads to a large reduction in transaction volumes and the rate of car turnover. The market does not collapse: income shocks induce households to sell their cars, even if they are of good quality, and this helps mitigate the lemons problem. The size of the lemons penalty declines when income uncertainty in the economy increases and when the supply of credit decreases.