American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · 2026 · Aloísio Barboza de Araújo、Vitor Costa、Paulo Lins、Rafael Santos、Serge de Valk
中文摘要
我们提出一个模型，用以研究高政府债务负担下的通货膨胀目标制。我们假定利他的政策制定者选择债务发行、通货膨胀与公共支出，而私人部门厌恶通货膨胀并为政府提供融资。我们表明，均衡通货膨胀取决于债务水平：(i) 债务较低时，通胀处于目标水平；(ii) 债务较高时，通胀高于目标；(iii) 在两者之间时，通胀或高于目标或处于目标水平，我们将这一区间命名为财政脆弱性。均衡通货膨胀还取决于目标水平本身：更高的目标可能通过防止财政脆弱性和降低债务展期成本来改善福利。(JEL E31, E52, E62, E63, H63, O11, O23)
Abstract
We propose a model to study an inflation-targeting regime under a high government debt burden. We assume that an altruistic policymaker chooses debt issuance, inflation, and public expenditure, while private agents dislike inflation and finance the government. We show that equilibrium inflation depends on debt level: (i) on-target when debt is low; (ii) above the target when debt is high; (iii) either above or on-target in between, a zone that we named fiscal fragility. Equilibrium inflation also depends on the target level: A higher target may improve welfare by preventing fiscal fragility and reducing debt-rollover costs. (JEL E31, E52, E62, E63, H63, O11, O23)