American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2025 · Lamar Pierce、Alex Rees-Jones、Charlotte Blank
中文摘要
行为经济学家提出，当奖金采用“损失框架”——即预先支付、若未达到目标则被追回——时，激励合同能带来更高的生产率。我们通过在294家汽车经销商随机分配销售奖金的预付或后付方式来检验这一主张。尽管统计上存在一定的不精确性，我们的分析提供了有力迹象，表明损失框架的随机分配产生了量级上重要的负面影响。我们证实，损失框架的负面影响可能源于对“博弈”行为激励的增加。基于这些发现，我们重新评估了关于损失框架可取性的普遍看法。（JEL C93, D91, J24, J33, L62, L81）
Abstract
Behavioral economists have proposed that incentive contracts result in higher productivity when bonuses are “loss framed”—prepaid then clawed back if targets are unmet. We test this claim by randomizing the pre- or postpayment of sales bonuses at 294 car dealerships. Although somewhat statistically imprecise, our analysis provides strong indications that the random assignment of loss framing had quantitatively important negative effects. We document that the negative effects of loss framing can arise due to an increase in incentives for “gaming” behaviors. Based on these claims, we reassess the common wisdom regarding the desirability of loss framing. (JEL C93, D91, J24, J33, L62, L81)