When meritocracy fails: College expansion and the rise of intergenerational persistence
中文摘要
本文量化了在完全基于择优的竞争性录取制度下高校扩招的效应,并将劳动力市场之前的条件内生化。我们构建了一个异质性主体生命周期模型,其中父母在多个阶段对子女的大学前人力资本进行投资,以竞争有限的大学名额。将该框架应用于中国——其录取完全依据分数排名,且过去25年招生规模增长了十倍——我们发现,基于分数的录取提高了人力资本在大学录取阶段相对于初始禀赋的重要性。因此,家庭资源通过父母对大学前人力资本的投资间接地影响录取结果。在这一制度下扩大大学入学机会会降低代际流动性,因为高收入家庭的反应是不成比例地增加大学前投资,从而强化了子女成绩与父母收入之间的联系。反事实分析表明,如果关闭内生的父母投资反应,代际流动性将随高校扩招而改善。
Abstract
This paper quantifies the effects of college expansion under purely merit-based, competitive admissions, endogenizing pre-labor-market conditions. We develop a heterogeneous-agent life-cycle model where parents invest in their children’s pre-college human capital at multiple stages to compete for limited college slots. Applying the framework to China—where admissions rely solely on score ranks and enrollment has grown tenfold over the past 25 years—we find that score-based admissions increase the importance of human capital at the college admission stage relative to initial endowments. Family resources therefore shape admission indirectly through parental investment in pre-college human capital. Expanding college access under this system reduces intergenerational mobility because higher-income families respond by disproportionately increasing pre-college investments, strengthening the link between child achievement and parental income. Counterfactuals show that mobility would improve with college expansion if endogenous parental investment responses were shut down.