Journal of Public Economics · 2026 · [{"name": "Antonio León", "affiliation": ["Queen Mary University of London"]}, {"name": "Kelly Santos", "affiliation": ["Insper"]}]
Abstract
The selection of public sector employees is crucial to state effectiveness. Given politicians’ influence on bureaucracies, could political accountability improve bureaucratic selection? Using randomized audits and individual-level data on Brazil’s public sector employees, this paper finds that audits enhance the quality of the bureaucracy. The results are driven by politicians’ increased incentives to perform well in office, stronger recruitment efforts, and a reduction in patronage. • Anti-corruption audits improve the quality of the match between public sector employees’ skills and tasks. • Effects seem to be driven by increases in political accountability, recruitment effort, and a reduction in patronage. • Transparency can enhance state capacity not only by reducing corruption, but also by improving the bureaucracy.