财政能力与资本错配：逃税的经济成本
Fiscal capacity and capital misallocation: the economic costs of tax evasion
Journal of Public Economics · 2026 · [{"name": "Yu Liu", "affiliation": ["Fudan University", "Shanghai University of International Business and Economics"]}, {"name": "Xiaoxue Zhao", "affiliation": ["Wesleyan University"]}]
中文摘要
本文考察发展中国家在跨空间执行统一税率方面行政能力低下这一现象，将其视为资本配置的驱动因素和低生产率的成因。我们依托中国的金税工程——一项信息技术改革，消除了地方税务执法机构通过现场检查核验企业销售与采购情况的必要性——作为自然实验，研究财政能力对企业选址和资本配置决策的影响。利用该改革对地理崎岖程度不同的中国各县财政能力造成的异质性冲击，我们发现金税工程显著拉平了中国各县之间的有效税率，这导致资本从改革后财政能力提升幅度更大的县域迁出。这种跨县资本再配置显著均衡了企业间的资本边际产出，并导致企业生产率分布向右移动。
Abstract
This paper examines developing countries’ low administrative capacity to enforce uniform tax rates across space as a driver of capital allocation and a cause of low productivity. We rely on the Golden Tax Project, an information technology reform in China that eliminates the need for local tax-enforcing agencies to verify firm sales and purchases through onsite inspections, as a natural experiment to study the effects of fiscal capacity on firms’ location and capital allocation decisions. Exploiting the heterogeneous shocks that the reform exerts on the fiscal capacity of Chinese counties with different geographic ruggedness, we find that the Golden Tax Project significantly leveled effective tax rates across Chinese counties, which caused capital to relocate out of counties that experienced a bigger fiscal capacity boost after the reform. Such cross-county capital reallocation significantly equalized the marginal product of capital across firms and caused a rightward shift in productivities among them.
📖 精读解析
本文已有三模型交叉精读卡片, 登录后可在站内查看结构化解读与关键图表。