匹配摩擦与扭曲信念：来自招聘会实验的证据
Matching Frictions and Distorted Beliefs: Evidence from a Job Fair Experiment
The Economic Journal · 2025 · [{"name": "Girum Abebe", "affiliation": ["World Bank"]}, {"name": "Stefano Caria", "affiliation": ["University of Warwick"]}, {"name": "Marcel Fafchamps", "affiliation": ["Stanford University"]}, {"name": "Paolo Falco", "affiliation": ["University of Copenhagen"]}, {"name": "Simon Franklin", "affiliation": ["Queen Mary University of London"]}, {"name": "Simon Quinn", "affiliation": ["Imperial College London"]}, {"name": "Forhad Shilpi", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
摘要 我们评估一项随机化招聘会干预的影响，在该干预中求职者和雇主可以低成本会面。该干预带来的雇佣很少，但它降低了参与者的预期，并促使企业和工人如理论模型所预测的那样更多地投入搜寻；这改善了受教育程度较低求职者的就业结果。通过一项独特的双边信念引致调查，我们证实企业和求职者对市场持有过度乐观的预期。这表明，除了减缓匹配之外，搜寻摩擦还有第二种未被充分研究的成本：它们固化了不准确的信念，进一步扭曲了搜寻策略和劳动力市场结果。
Abstract
Abstract We evaluate the impacts of a randomised job fair intervention in which jobseekers and employers can meet at low cost. The intervention generates few hires, but it lowers participants’ expectations and causes both firms and workers to invest more in search as predicted by a theoretical model; this improves employment outcomes for less educated jobseekers. Through a unique two-sided belief-elicitation survey, we confirm that firms and jobseekers have overoptimistic expectations about the market. This suggests that, beyond slowing down matching, search frictions have a second understudied cost: they entrench inaccurate beliefs, further distorting search strategies and labour-market outcomes.