中文摘要
我研究一个简单的公平—效率问题：设计者将固定数量的货币分配给一群边际货币价值私人可观测且各不相同的代理人。她只能通过施加一种“磨难”来甄别——即向参与社会性浪费活动（如排队或填写表格）的代理人分配更多货币。当参与该浪费活动的货币计价成本最低的代理人对货币的期望价值超过平均价值两倍以上时，一次性总额转移支付会被磨难机制所胜过。（JEL D63, D82, H23, I38）
Abstract
I study a simple equity-efficiency problem: A designer allocates a fixed amount of money to a population of agents differing in privately observed marginal values for money. She can only screen by imposing an “ordeal”—that is, by allocating more money to agents who engage in a socially wasteful activity (such as queuing or filling out forms). Giving a lumpsum transfer is outperformed by an ordeal mechanism when agents with the lowest money-denominated cost of engaging in the wasteful activity have an expected value for money that exceeds the average value by more than a factor of two. (JEL D63, D82, H23, I38)