American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 2026 · Dan Cao、Roger Lagunoff、Yingqi Xu
中文摘要
本文考察联邦制下地方财富不平等与产权地方政治之间的动态联系。我们构建了一个辖区模型,该辖区由政治上占主导地位的内群体和被边缘化的外群体构成。在每一个时期,辖区都试图对生产性资产的索取权进行再分配。外群体可以诉诸其占有的正当程序权利(rights of possession, ROP),对任何变更现状的举措提出法律挑战。然而,辖区利用法律制度的薄弱之处,系统地将产权索取权从外群体再分配给内群体。它将征收与分区管制限制同公共资产的杠杆化运用相结合,以威慑法律挑战。我们考察了这种杠杆作用如何随时间变化,并如何取决于现状效应以及法律对特定资产的优先保护。我们的结果为美国系统性的财富差距提供了一个地方化的政治经济学解释。
Abstract
This paper examines the dynamic connections between local wealth inequality and the local politics of property rights within a federal system. We model a jurisdiction comprising a politically dominant in-group and a marginalized out-group. At each date, the jurisdiction tries to redistribute claims on productive assets. The out-group can legally challenge any changes to the status quo by appealing to its due process rights of possession (ROP). Nevertheless, the jurisdiction exploits weaknesses in the legal system to systematically redistribute property claims away from the out-group and toward the in-group. It combines takings and zoning restrictions with the leveraging of public assets to deter legal challenges. We examine how this leverage varies across time and depends on status quo effects and legal prioritization of certain assets. Our results provide a localized political economy explanation for systemic wealth disparities in the U.S.