International Economic Review · 2026 · Gustavo de Souza、André Victor D. Luduvice
中文摘要
在美国,劳动者必须满足两项条件方可领取失业保险(UI):一是要求最低工作持续时间的任职期条件,二是要求过去收入达到最低金额的货币条件。利用失业保险规则在州边界处的不连续性,我们发现这两项条件均能减少失业;其中货币条件会减少雇主数量和兼职劳动者份额,而任职期条件的作用则相反。我们构建了一个失业保险待遇依赖历史的异质性主体模型来解释这些结果,并据此量化最优的功利主义失业保险设计。最优政策设有较高的货币条件和较短的任职期条件。
Abstract
ABSTRACT In the United States, workers must satisfy two requirements to receive unemployment insurance (UI): a tenure requirement of a minimum work spell and a monetary requirement of past minimum earnings. Using discontinuity of UI rules at state borders, we find that both requirements reduce unemployment and that the monetary requirement decreases the number of employers and the share of part‐time workers, while the tenure requirement has the opposite effect. We develop a heterogeneous agents model with history‐dependent UI benefits to explain these results and quantify an optimal utilitarian UI design. The optimal policy has a high monetary and a short tenure requirement.