货币政策与内生性金融危机
Monetary Policy and Endogenous Financial Crises
Review of Economic Studies · 2026 · [{"name": "Frédéric Boissay", "affiliation": ["Bank for International Settlements"]}, {"name": "Fabrice Collard", "affiliation": ["Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique", "Toulouse School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Jordi Gaĺı", "affiliation": ["Universitat Pompeu Fabra", "Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional", "Barcelona School of Economics"]}, {"name": "Cristina Manea", "affiliation": ["Bank for International Settlements"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 货币政策通过哪些渠道影响金融稳定？中央银行能否（以及是否应当）通过偏离价格稳定来预防金融危机？货币政策本身在多大程度上可能无意中滋生金融脆弱性？我们使用一个包含资本积累、且因信贷市场中的逆向选择与道德风险而产生内生金融危机的新凯恩斯模型来回答这些问题。我们的发现有三点。第一，货币政策在短期（通过总需求）和中期（通过资本积累）都会影响危机发生的概率。第二，中央银行可以通过在短期容忍更高的通胀波动，来降低中期危机的发生率。第三，长期宽松的货币政策之后紧接急剧紧缩，可能引发金融危机。
Abstract
Abstract What are the channels through which monetary policy affects financial stability? Can (and should) central banks prevent financial crises by deviating from price stability? To what extent may monetary policy itself unintentionally breed financial vulnerabilities? We answer these questions using a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and endogenous financial crises due to adverse selection and moral hazard in credit markets. Our findings are threefold. First, monetary policy affects the probability of a crisis both in the short run (via aggregate demand) and in the medium run (via capital accumulation). Second, the central bank can reduce the incidence of crises in the medium run by tolerating higher inflation volatility in the short run. Third, prolonged periods of loose monetary policy followed by a sharp tightening can lead to financial crises.