透明度何时失效：印尼地方银行代理人的经济激励

中文摘要

我们研究提高向地方代理人提供的、用于获取新银行产品客户的财务激励水平及其透明度对产品采纳的影响。我们发现，向代理人支付更高的激励会提高产品的采纳和使用，但仅当潜在客户不知晓这些激励时才成立。当激励被披露后，尽管代理人付出了更多努力，更高的激励对采纳和使用并无影响。这是因为财务激励向潜在客户传递了关于该产品可靠性和可信度的负面信号。因此，在设计激励时，组织应同时考虑其水平和透明度。

Abstract

Abstract We study the effect of raising the level and transparency of financial incentives offered to local agents for acquiring clients of a new banking product on take-up. We find that paying agents higher incentives increases take-up and usage, but only when the incentives are unknown to prospective clients. When disclosed, higher incentives have no effect on take-up and usage, despite greater agent effort. This is due to the financial incentives sending a negative signal to potential clients about the reliability and trustworthiness of the product. Hence, when designing incentives, organizations should consider both their level and transparency.