中文摘要
我们构建并检验了一个财政问责模型，其中各政党围绕由税收、公共品供给和政治租金构成的一体化财政纲领展开竞争。该理论展示了权力分享制度如何约束租金攫取：从选票到权力的映射中不成比例程度越高，边际选票损失的政治成本就越大；在内部均衡上，这会降低租金、增加公共品供给并改善选民福利。我们在一个同时观察候选人纲领选择与选民行为的实验室选举环境中检验这些预测。证据支持核心制度机制：不成比例规则降低了所提议的租金，使纲领转向公共品供给，并提高了选民的总体福利。然而，问责仍不完全：选民确实对财政表现作出反应，但反应程度低于理性（自动化）基准；党派偏见削弱了对立阵营选民的政策回应性；而且一种公共品“策略”使得租金在与公共品收益捆绑时，在选举上的代价更低。
Abstract
We develop and test a model of fiscal accountability in which parties compete over integrated fiscal platforms comprising taxes, public-good provision, and political rents. The theory shows how power-sharing institutions discipline rent extraction: greater disproportionality in the vote-to-power mapping increases the political cost of marginal vote losses and, along the interior equilibrium, reduces rents, raises public-good provision, and improves voter welfare. We test these predictions in a laboratory election environment that observes both candidate platform choices and voter behavior. The evidence supports the central institutional mechanism. The disproportional rule reduces proposed rents, shifts platforms toward public-good provision, and increases aggregate voter welfare. Accountability, however, remains incomplete. Voters respond to fiscal performance, but less than the rational (automated) benchmark; partisan bias dampens policy responsiveness among opposing voters; and a public-good “gambit” makes rents less electorally costly when bundled with public-good gains.