Journal of Public Economics · 2026 · Adam L. Kern
中文摘要
许多税收制度是在其他政府不征税的范围内筹集收入的。本文构建了一个关于此类跨境最低税应如何设计的理论,重点关注影响该税制被规避程度的选择。让最低税更难规避,能将更多企业留在该税制之内,但会削弱避税地之间的竞争;避税地于是将税率提高至接近最低税率,从而降低对转移利润征收的补足税率。其结果是,可被规避的最低税反而可能比不可规避的最低税为征收国政府筹集更多收入。
Abstract
Many tax regimes collect revenue to the extent that other governments do not. This paper develops a theory of how such cross-border minimum taxes should be designed, focusing on choices that affect avoidance of the regime. Making a minimum tax more difficult to avoid retains more firms within the regime but weakens competition among tax havens. Havens then raise their rates toward the minimum, reducing the top-up tax rate on shifted profit. As a result, an avoidable minimum tax can raise more revenue for the governments that impose it than an unavoidable one.