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零售犯罪的转嫁

The Pass-Through of Retail Crime
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2026 · Carl Hase、Johannes Kasinger

中文摘要

本文表明,零售商为应对有组织零售犯罪而提高价格。我们将店铺层面的犯罪数据与华盛顿州全部大麻零售商交易的扫描数据相匹配。利用抢劫和入室盗窃提供的准实验变化,我们发现受害店铺及邻近竞争对手的价格上涨 1.7%–1.8%。这一上涨并非由短期至中期的需求变化所驱动,而与犯罪相关的成本冲击相一致。效应在独立店铺和集中度较低的市场中更大。我们估计,犯罪对受影响店铺构成 1% 的“隐性”单位税,意味着 3,070 万美元的额外社会成本,且主要由消费者承担。

Abstract

This paper shows retailers increase prices in response to organized retail crime. We match store-level crime data to scanner data from the universe of transactions for cannabis retailers in Washington state. Using quasi-experimental variation from robberies and burglaries, we find a 1.7–1.8 percent price increase at victimized stores and nearby competitors. This rise is not driven by short-to-medium-term demand changes but is consistent with crime-related cost shocks. Effects are larger for independent stores and less concentrated markets. We estimate crime imposes a 1 percent "hidden" unit tax on affected stores, implying $30.7 million in additional social costs, primarily borne by consumers.
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