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不完全竞争金融市场中的政府交易与效率

Government trading and efficiency in imperfectly competitive financial markets
Journal of Economic Theory · 2026 · Daniel Neuhann、Michael Sockin

中文摘要

我们分析公共资产购买如何影响不完全竞争金融市场中的流动性、风险分担与跨期平滑。即便是“中性”政策,例如预算平衡的无风险债务交易,也会影响流动性与交易效率。公共债务购买通过提高价格冲击而恶化流动性与风险分担,而债务出售则改善风险分担但扭曲跨期交易。因此,“扩张性”量化宽松政策可能降低交易效率。我们还推导了用于最优公共资产组合管理的基于数量的交易规则。这些规则要求政策使公共与私人价格冲击的加权度量相等。

Abstract

We analyze how public asset purchases affect liquidity, risk sharing and intertemporal smoothing in imperfectly competitive financial markets. Even “neutral” policies, such as budget-balanced trades of risk-free debt, affect liquidity and trading efficiency. Public debt purchases worsen liquidity and risk sharing by increasing price impact, while debt sales improve risk sharing but distort intertemporal trade. “Expansionary” quantitative easing policies can thus reduce trading efficiency. We also derive quantity-based trading rules for optimal public portfolio management. These call for policy to equalize weighted measures of public and private price impact.
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