中文摘要
我们在一个 RFQ 交易模型中证明,即使有更多交易商可供选择,客户也可能只接纳少数几家交易商,以诱导出最大化的流动性供给——“少即是多”。被接纳的交易商数量由一个竞争弹性决定,该弹性受交易商响应 RFQ 的成本影响。例如,更高的搜寻 (运营) 成本会增加 (减少) 被接纳的交易商数量。社会计划者会强制规定比市场结果甚至更少的交易商数量,因为客户诱发了过度的交易商竞争。该模型预示了内生的市场势力,对电子平台的监管与设计具有启示,并阐明了在市场压力之下客户与交易商之间的互动。
Abstract
We show in a model of RFQ trading that customers may admit only a few dealers, even when more are available, to induce maximum liquidity supply—“less can be more.” The number of admitted dealers is pinned down by a competition elasticity, shaped by dealers’ cost to respond to RFQs. For example, higher search (operating) costs increase (reduce) admitted dealers. A social planner would mandate even fewer dealers than the market outcome, because customers induce excessive dealer competition. The model predicts endogenous market power, yields implications for regulation and design of electronic platforms, and speaks to customer-dealer interactions under market stress.