中文摘要
如何最优地激励及时披露?我们在一个一般性模型中研究这一问题:技术突破在一个不确定的时刻发生并被代理人私下观察到,而委托人必须通过其对与收益相关的实物配置的控制来激励披露。我们揭示了最优机制的截止期限结构:在一种重要的特殊情形中,最优机制呈现简单的截止期限形式;而在一般情形中,则呈现分级截止期限结构。我们将上述结果应用于失业保险方案的设计。
Abstract
How best to incentivize prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivize disclosure via her control of a payoff‐relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes.