中文摘要
定向广告如何影响选举结果？本文构建了一个一维空间投票模型，其中拥有私人信息的挑战者说服选民支持他而非维持现状。我表明，定向广告使挑战者能够说服偏好相反的选民，并左右由这类选民决定胜负的选举。事前承诺能力并非必要——挑战者通过策略性地向不同选民披露不同的可验证信息片段而取得成功。公开所有政治广告将减轻定向广告的负面影响，并帮助选民集体做出正确选择。（JEL D72, D82, D83, M37）
Abstract
How does targeted advertising influence electoral outcomes? This paper presents a one-dimensional spatial model of voting in which a privately informed challenger persuades voters to support him over the status quo. I show that targeted advertising enables the challenger to persuade voters with opposing preferences and swing elections decided by such voters. Ex ante commitment power is unnecessary—the challenger succeeds by strategically revealing different pieces of verifiable information to different voters. Publicizing all political ads would mitigate the negative effects of targeted advertising and help voters collectively make the right choice. (JEL D72, D82, D83, M37)