American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 2026 · Marcos Yamada Nakaguma、Danilo Souza
中文摘要
本文研究选举竞选攻击的决定因素。我们首先提出一个模型，考察影响候选人攻击决策的主要因素。我们的理论分析得出若干预测，并利用巴西“答辩权”(right of reply) 诉讼的信息加以检验。我们的实证分析利用基于第二名与第三名候选人之间“虚拟平局”的断点回归设计，表明具有选举优势的候选人更可能受到攻击。随后，我们利用另一个断点表明，在单轮与双轮投票的相对多数制下，竞选攻击的模式存在显著差异。(JEL D72, D74, K16)
Abstract
This paper studies the determinants of electoral campaign attacks. We first propose a model to examine the main factors that influence candidates' decisions to attack. Our theoretical analysis yields a number of predictions that we test using information from “right of reply” lawsuits filed in Brazil. Our empirical analysis exploits a regression discontinuity design based on virtual ties between second- and third-place candidates to show that candidates with an electoral advantage are more likely to receive an attack. We then exploit another discontinuity to show that the patterns of campaign attacks differ significantly under single- and dual-ballot plurality systems. (JEL D72, D74, K16)