中文摘要
我们提供一个一般性框架，用于分析竞争性瓶颈环境下寡头平台之间的竞争，该框架允许平台进行定价与非价格设计选择，并允许买卖双方在参与后进行决策。我们表明，平台的均衡选择以损害卖方利益的方式被扭曲，从而有害于福利（例如设定过高的佣金费用），并且竞争平台数量的增加可能加剧这一扭曲。我们还刻画了买方在互动收益上的异质性、部分市场覆盖、平台不对称性以及跨平台溢出如何进一步放大或缓解福利扭曲。基于我们的发现，我们讨论了针对移动应用平台的政策含义。（JEL D43, L13, L25, L96）
Abstract
We provide a general framework to analyze competition between oligopolistic platforms in competitive bottleneck settings, allowing for pricing and nonprice design choices by platforms, and post-participation buyer-seller decisions. We show that equilibrium choices by platforms are distorted against sellers’ interests in a way harmful to welfare (e.g., setting excessive commission fees), and that an increase in the number of competing platforms can exacerbate this distortion. We also characterize how buyer-side heterogeneity in interaction benefits, partial market coverage, platform asymmetry, and cross-platform spillovers further amplify or mitigate welfare distortions. Based on our findings, we discuss policy implications for mobile app platforms. (JEL D43, L13, L25, L96)