中文摘要
重复拍卖被广泛用于出售耐用资产，未售出物品会举行后续拍卖。我们从理论和实证两方面研究此类拍卖。理论分析表明，当买方面临进入成本时，重复拍卖优于单轮拍卖，原因是潜在买方的排序进入提高了效率与收入。我们刻画了最优保留价序列。来自中国住房法拍市场的实证结果显示，与单轮拍卖相比，采用重复拍卖每年可显著提升效率（34.0亿美元，16.60%）与收入（29.7亿美元，15.92%）。实施最优保留价可进一步提升效率（3.35%）与收入（3.06%）。（JEL D44, D82, R31）
Abstract
Recurring auctions are widely used to sell durable assets, with follow-up auctions held for unsold items. We investigate such auctions theoretically and empirically. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that recurring auctions outperform single-round auctions when buyers face entry costs, enhancing efficiency and revenue due to sorted entry of potential buyers. Optimal reserve price sequences are characterized. Empirical findings from home foreclosure auctions in China reveal significant annual gains in efficiency (US$3.40 billion, 16.60 percent) and revenue (US$2.97 billion, 15.92 percent) using recurring auctions compared with single-round auctions. Implementing optimal reserve prices can further improve efficiency (3.35 percent) and revenue (3.06 percent). (JEL D44, D82, R31)