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公务员考试制度下的官僚招聘歧视

Discrimination in Bureaucratic Recruitment Under Civil Service Exams
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · 2027 · Thorbjørn Sejr Guul、Jens Lemb

中文摘要

择优录用是韦伯官僚制理论的核心信条,该理论认为雇员应基于才干获得聘用。然而,大量研究提供了针对少数族裔的招聘歧视的证据,这与官僚遴选的基本原则相悖。本文考察当官僚组织使用公务员考试来评估候选人的才干与岗位适配性时,族裔和种族少数群体是否受到歧视。利用纽约市地方政府的数据和候选人名单固定效应方法,我们发现考试成绩相近时,黑人和西班牙裔候选人比白人候选人略更可能被录用,这表明这些少数族裔在官僚遴选中占有小幅优势。然而,通过考察新受聘者的起薪水平,我们发现少数族裔受聘时的薪资更低,并且与情况相当的白人受聘者相比,其较高的考试分数所获得的薪酬回报更少。我们的发现表明,公务员考试可能是确保官僚遴选公平无偏的重要杠杆,但并不能阻止招聘过程后续环节中的歧视。

Abstract

ABSTRACT Meritocratic recruitment is a central tenet in Weber's theory of bureaucracy, which states that employees should be hired based on merit. However, extensive research has shown evidence of hiring discrimination against minorities, breaking with basic principles in bureaucratic selection. This paper examines whether ethnic and racial minorities are discriminated against when bureaucratic organizations use civil service exams to assess candidates' merit and fitness for positions. Drawing on data from the local government of New York City and a candidate list fixed effects approach, we find that Black and Hispanic candidates are slightly more likely to be hired than White candidates with similar exam scores, suggesting that these ethnic minorities hold a small advantage in bureaucratic selection. However, examining the starting compensation levels of new hires, we show that minorities are hired at lower salaries and are compensated less for high exam scores than comparable White hires. Our findings suggest that civil service exams might be an important lever for securing fair and unbiased bureaucratic selection but also that they do not prevent discrimination in later steps of the recruitment process.
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