International Economic Review · 2025 · Gaëtan Fournier、Alberto Grillo、Yevgeny Tsodikovich
中文摘要
我们研究候选人针对选民偏好信息所做的立场调整。重新定位可使候选人向中位选民靠拢,但会带来财务成本与选举成本。在子博弈完美均衡中,若调整成本足够大,候选人事前将偏离中心立场。这使得当信息强烈有利于己方时,他们能够提高无须付出成本即获胜的可能性。我们的理论凸显了竞争性选举中竞选阶段的温和化动态,以及受青睐的候选人预先做出的微小调整所发挥的重要作用。
Abstract
ABSTRACT We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame‐perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large. This allows them to increase the chances of a costless victory when the information is strongly in their favor. Our theory highlights a dynamic of moderation during the campaign stage in competitive elections, as well as a prominent role for minor adjustments made preemptively by the favored candidate.