Do Engine‐Specific Tax Programs Work? A Structural Analysis of Market Spillovers and Welfare Implications
中文摘要
本文考察发展中国家广泛用于限制汽车尾气排放的排量专项税收政策。以中国2015年针对小排量汽车的税收减免政策为例,我们发现小排量与大排量汽车的价格和销量均出现显著反应,表明存在较强的竞争溢出效应。量化模型显示,汽车保有量增加所产生的汽车尾气排放,超过了由大排量汽车向小排量汽车转移所带来的排放减少量。福利分析进一步表明,政府税收收入的减少与汽车尾气排放的增加显著超过家庭福利与企业利润的增加,从而使排量专项税收政策对社会整体并无益处。
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper examines engine‐specific tax programs that are widely used in developing countries to limit car emissions. Using China's tax abatement program for small vehicles in 2015, we find significant price and sales responses for both small and large vehicles, indicating strong competition spillovers. The quantification model shows that an increase in car ownership generates more car emissions than the reduction resulting from the relocation from large to small vehicles. Welfare analysis further shows that the reduced government tax revenue and increased car emissions significantly outweigh the increased household welfare and firm profits, rendering the engine‐specific tax program socially unbeneficial.