Pay Transparency and Inventor Productivity: Evidence From State‐Level Pay Secrecy Laws
中文摘要
我们利用州级薪酬保密法的交错(分批)通过——此类法律增强了工作场所的薪酬透明度——来考察薪酬透明度在发明者生产率中的作用。我们发现, 位于已通过此类法律的州的企业, 其发明者生产率相对于其他地区的企业显著提高。对于先前薪酬透明度较低的州的企业, 这一关系更为明显。我们进一步表明, 薪酬保密法通过激励发明者——尤其是少数族裔发明者——付出更多努力、提高发明者团队的多样性并鼓励所有发明者追求晋升, 从而提升发明者生产率。
Abstract
Abstract We examine the role of pay transparency in inventor productivity by exploiting the staggered adoption of state‐level pay secrecy laws, which enhance pay transparency in the workplace. We find a significant increase in inventor productivity of firms located in states that have passed such laws relative to firms elsewhere. This relation is more pronounced for firms in states with lower levels of pre‐existing pay transparency. We further show that pay secrecy laws promote inventor productivity by motivating inventors—especially minority inventors—to exert more effort, enhancing the diversity of inventor teams, and encouraging all inventors to pursue promotions.