The RAND Journal of Economics · 2025 · Chih‐Sheng Hsieh、Michael König、Xiaodong Liu
中文摘要
本文引入一个研发网络形成模型,其中企业同时选择研发努力水平与合作伙伴。网络中的邻居通过技术溢出从彼此的研发中获益,同时存在反映研发策略性替代的竞争效应。我们给出了完整的均衡刻画,并开发了一种对大型网络而言在计算上可行的估计方法。随后,我们对研发合作补贴进行了分析,发现针对特定研发合作的补贴方案可能比统一补贴更为有效,其福利收益最高可达补贴成本的五倍。
Abstract
ABSTRACT We introduce an R&D network formation model where firms choose both R&D efforts and collaboration partners. Neighbors in the network benefit from each other's R&D through technology spillovers, and there exists competition effects reflecting strategic substitutability in R&D. We provide a complete equilibrium characterization, and develop an estimation method that is computationally feasible for large networks. We then conduct an analysis of R&D collaboration subsidies, and find that a subsidy scheme targeting specific R&D collaborations can be more effective than a uniform subsidy, with a welfare gain up to five times larger than the cost of the subsidy.