中文摘要
我们研究掠夺在动态环境中的可行性与盈利性,采用一个简约的无限期界、完全信息设定,其中在位者反复面对潜在进入。当对手进入时,在位者选择容忍还是对其发起掠夺;进入者随后决定留存还是退出。我们证明总存在马尔可夫完美均衡,且该均衡可分为三种类型:容忍、垄断化与反复掠夺。随后,我们分析并比较不同反垄断政策的福利效应,并将反复掠夺可能改善福利这一可能性纳入考量。
Abstract
ABSTRACT We study the feasibility and profitability of predation in a dynamic environment, using a parsimonious infinite‐horizon, complete information setting in which an incumbent repeatedly faces potential entry. When a rival enters, the incumbent chooses whether to accommodate or predate it; the entrant then decides whether to stay or exit. We show that there always exists a Markov perfect equilibrium, which can be of three types: accommodation, monopolization, and recurrent predation. We then analyze and compare the welfare effects of different antitrust policies, accounting for the possibility that recurrent predation may be welfare improving.