中文摘要
本文考察一种多单位按报价支付的采购拍卖,其中拍卖人固定总支出,并以预先设定且保密的预算最大化采购数量。已有文献分析了固定数量拍卖,即交易数量固定但竞标者并不知晓该数量。与这类拍卖相比,预算拍卖通过引入竞标者各报价之间的额外互动而降低了拍卖人的成本:竞标者不仅需要在某一单位上获得更高的利润率与该单位供给概率降低之间进行权衡;某一单位上更高的利润率还会降低预算足以从该竞标者处采购更多单位的概率。
Abstract
ABSTRACT This article investigates a multi‐unit pay‐as‐bid procurement auction where the auctioneer fixes total spending and maximizes the quantity procured with their predetermined, secret budget. Previous literature has analyzed fixed‐quantity auctions, where the traded quantity is fixed but unknown to the bidders. Compared to such auctions, budget auctions lower the auctioneer's costs by introducing an additional interaction between a bidder's bids; bidders not only weigh a higher profit margin on a unit against a lower probability of supplying that unit; a higher margin on some unit also reduces the probability that the budget suffices to procure more units from the bidder.