一石二鸟：农业对水污染规制的反应
Two birds, one stone: Responses of agriculture to water pollution regulation
Journal of Development Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Binlei Gong", "affiliation": ["Zhejiang University"]}, {"name": "Haoyang Li", "affiliation": ["Nanjing Agricultural University"]}, {"name": "Liguo Lin", "affiliation": ["Shanghai University of Finance and Economics"]}, {"name": "Hanxiang Ling", "affiliation": ["Shanghai University of Finance and Economics"]}, {"name": "Wei Sun", "affiliation": ["Shanghai University of Finance and Economics"]}]
中文摘要
本文将中国的水质控制考核计划作为一项自然实验，考察环境规制对化肥使用和粮食安全的影响。利用因各县相对于水质监测站位置不同而形成的执法激励变异，我们记录到上游县化肥施用量减少了5.9%，这一减少由农业公共财政支持的下降所驱动。强调农业是主要污染源的信息显著性强化了抑制化肥使用的执法激励。农业产出保持稳定，这既反映了此前化肥的过度使用，也反映了可能与水质改善相关的轻微生产率提升。
Abstract
This paper exploits China’s Water Quality Control Assessment Plan as a natural experiment to examine the impact of environmental regulation on fertilizer use and food security. Leveraging variation in enforcement incentives across counties determined by their locations relative to water quality monitoring stations, we document a 5.9 % fertilizer application reduction in upstream counties, driven by reduction in public financial support for agriculture. Salience of information highlighting agriculture as a major pollution source reinforces enforcement incentives in curbing fertilizer use. Agricultural output remained stable, reflecting both prior overuse of fertilizer and slight productivity gains likely associated with improved water quality.