Are Complementary Policies Substitutes? Evidence from R&D Subsidies in the United Kingdom
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2026 · [{"name": "Jacquelyn Pless", "affiliation": []}]
中文摘要
本文研究针对私人研发的拨款与税收激励究竟是互补还是替代关系。我采用多种准实验研究设计考察英国企业，发现提高税收抵免的慷慨程度会显著增强拨款资金对小企业研发的影响，表明这两种政策工具具有互补性。融资约束很可能在其中发挥作用：对于看似受约束的企业，这一效应最强，且政策组合提高了研发"进入"。此外，我发现对于通常较少受约束的大型企业，这两种工具是替代关系。一些替代性解释可以被排除。（JEL D22, H25, H81, L25, O31, O38）
Abstract
This paper studies whether grants and tax incentives for private R&D are complements or substitutes. I use multiple quasi-experimental research designs to examine firms in the United Kingdom and find that increasing tax credit generosity substantially enhances the effect of grant funding on R&D for small firms, suggesting that the instruments are complements. Financial constraints are likely at play. The effects are strongest for firms that appear constrained, and the combination of policies increases R&D “entry.” Furthermore, I find that the instruments are substitutes for larger firms, which are usually less constrained. Some alternative explanations can be ruled out. (JEL D22, H25, H81, L25, O31, O38)