政府对私人部门投资的配置含义
Allocative implications of government investment in private sector
Journal of Development Economics · 2025 · [{"name": "Lili Lian", "affiliation": ["Shanghai University of Finance and Economics", "Peking University", "Peking University Shenzhen Hospital"]}, {"name": "Jingyi Zhang", "affiliation": ["Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China", "Shanghai University of Finance and Economics"]}]
中文摘要
在中国，国有股东对民营企业进行少数股权投资。我们使用一个包含金融摩擦和异质性生产率的两部门DSGE模型，研究此类政府投资的资源配置含义。在我们的模型中，民营所有者比国有所有者生产率更高，但面临更紧的金融约束。国有所有者的股权投资缓解了民营所有者的金融约束，但抑制了其自身的生产率，这与中国企业层面数据一致。在这一设定下，只有生产率足够高的民营所有者才会接受此类投资，而只有生产率足够低的国有所有者才会进行此类投资。因此，此类政府投资的扩张改善了各部门内部以及部门之间的资本配置。我们的分析表明，包括放开利率管制和缩小部门之间贷款价值比差距在内的金融自由化，会刺激民营所有者对此类政府投资的需求，但会抑制国有所有者进行此类投资，从而对总体生产率产生模棱两可的影响。
Abstract
In China, state owners make minority equity investments in private firms. We study the allocative implications of such government investments using a two-sector DSGE model with financial friction and idiosyncratic productivities. In our model, private owners are more productive than state owners but face tighter financial constraints. Equity investment by a state owner alleviates the private owner’s financial constraint but dampens its own productivity, consistent with Chinese firm-level data. Under this setup, only private owners with sufficiently high productivity accept such investment, while only state owners with sufficiently low productivity make such investment. As a result, expansion of such government investment improves capital allocation within each sector and across sectors. Our analysis shows that financial liberalizations, including liberalizing interest-rate controls and reducing the loan-to-value gap between sectors, stimulate private owners’ demand for such government investment but discourage state owners from making it, thus generating an ambiguous effect on aggregate productivity.