信息助推、补贴与注意力的挤出: 来自能效投资领域的证据
Information Nudges, Subsidies, and Crowding Out of Attention: Field Evidence from Energy Efficiency Investments
Journal of the European Economic Association · 2025 · [{"name": "Matthias Rodemeier", "affiliation": ["Bocconi University"]}, {"name": "Andreas Löschel", "affiliation": ["University Hospitals of the Ruhr-University of Bochum"]}]
中文摘要
摘要 信息如何替代或补充庇古补贴等经济激励？我们通过一项大规模实地实验回答这一问题，该实验将能效补贴与关于LED照明财务节省的信息进行交叉随机化。信息具有两种效应：它使需求曲线发生位移并旋转。位移的方向是不确定的，且高度依赖于信息设计。告知消费者LED每年可节省90%的能源成本会提高LED需求，但向他们展示这90%相当于平均11欧元，则会提高对低效技术的需求。需求曲线的旋转方向是明确的：信息显著降低了自身价格弹性和交叉价格弹性，这使得补贴的效果减弱。价格弹性的普遍下降表明，在提供信息时，消费者对补贴的关注度降低。我们通过结构估计发现，当与信息结合时，福利最大化补贴可能比庇古基准高出200%。
Abstract
Abstract How can information substitute or complement financial incentives such as Pigouvian subsidies? We answer this question in a large-scale field experiment that cross-randomizes energy efficiency subsidies with information about the financial savings of LED lighting. Information has two effects: It shifts and rotates demand curves. The direction of the shift is ambiguous and highly dependent on the information design. Informing consumers that an LED saves 90% in annual energy costs increases LED demand, but showing them that 90% corresponds to an average of €11 raises demand for less efficient technologies. The rotation of the demand curve is unambiguous: Information dramatically reduces both own-price and cross-price elasticities, which makes subsidies less effective. The uniform decrease in price elasticities suggests that consumers pay less attention to subsidies when information is provided. We structurally estimate that welfare-maximizing subsidies can be 200% larger than the Pigouvian benchmark when combined with information.