胡萝卜与大棒：更高工资如何使政客暴露于暴力犯罪之下
Plata y Plomo: How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2026 · [{"name": "Massimo Pulejo", "affiliation": ["Bocconi University"]}, {"name": "Pablo Querubín", "affiliation": ["WiLAN (Canada)"]}]
中文摘要
在犯罪集团同时诉诸贿赂与暴力的情况下, 政治人物的工资对腐败有何影响? 基于断点回归设计和三种不同的腐败代理变量, 我们发现, 薪酬更高的意大利政治人物更有可能推动采购中的透明与竞争, 但同时也更有可能招致犯罪集团的袭击。工资的效应在三年后趋于消退, 其驱动力来自现任者行为的改变, 而非选任(候选人筛选)的改善。这些发现揭示了更高的工资何以可能遏制腐败, 却也助长了以暴力作为影响政策制定的替代手段。(JEL D72, D73, J31, K42)
Abstract
What is the effect of politicians’ wages on corruption in the presence of criminal groups that use both bribes and violence? With a regression discontinuity design and three distinct proxies for corruption, we show that better-paid Italian politicians are more likely to promote transparency and competition in procurement but also more likely to incur criminal attacks. The effects of wages, which subside after three years, are driven by changes in incumbents’ behavior rather than improved selection. These findings show how higher wages may curb corruption, but also foster the use of violence as an alternative tool to influence policymaking. (JEL D72, D73, J31, K42)