晋升与生产率: 公共部门中优绩主义与薪酬进阶的作用
Promotions and Productivity: The Role of Meritocracy and Pay Progression in the Public Sector
AER: Insights · 2025 · [{"name": "Erika Deserranno", "affiliation": ["Bocconi University"]}, {"name": "Philipp Kastrau", "affiliation": ["Open Philanthropy Project"]}, {"name": "Gianmarco León", "affiliation": ["Universitat Pompeu Fabra", "Barcelona School of Economics"]}]
中文摘要
我们研究公共部门中的晋升激励。我们与塞拉利昂卫生部合作，外生地引入了卫生工作者晋升至主管职位过程中任人唯贤程度的变异，以及卫生工作者对晋升后薪酬增长感知的变异。十个月后，我们的研究结果显示，任人唯贤使卫生工作者的生产率提高了22%。更大的感知薪酬增长在任人唯贤程度更高的体系中使生产率提高23%，而在任人唯贤程度较低的体系中则使生产率降低27%。我们的研究表明，这种降低与负向士气效应是一致的。（JEL C93, H51, I11, J24, J31, M51, O15）
Abstract
We study promotion incentives in the public sector. In collaboration with Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Health, we introduce exogenous variation in the meritocratic nature of promotions from health worker to supervisor positions and in health workers’ perceptions of pay progression upon promotion. Ten months later, our findings reveal that meritocracy leads to a 22 percent increase in health workers’ productivity. Greater perceived pay progression in a meritocratic system boosts productivity by 23 percent, whereas in a less meritocratic system, it decreases productivity by 27 percent. We show that this reduction is consistent with a negative morale effect. (JEL C93, H51, I11, J24, J31, M51, O15)