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税收隐私

Tax Privacy
Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2025 · [{"name": "Joel Slemrod", "affiliation": ["Michigan United"]}]

中文摘要

实施公平且有效率的税收体系,要求政府能够获取有关纳税人的某些信息。如果对隐私的需求意味着限制政府获取相关信息,那么这就会制约税收体系实现上述目标的程度。以此种方式,限制政府获取信息的需求会施加社会成本。本文讨论了隐私中重要的方面,包括信息泄露,并考察了若干国家对纳税人信息公开披露的做法。随后,本文讨论了有关纳税人如何评价税收隐私的已知情况,以及确定这种评价的困难;探讨向纳税人提供信息披露选择是否能够缓解隐私诉求与原本最优的税收政策之间的张力;并以财富税为例,说明由此产生的政策权衡。

Abstract

Implementing an equitable and efficient tax system requires that the government have access to certain information about taxpayers. If the demand for privacy implies limiting government’s access to relevant information, it constrains the extent to which a tax system can achieve these goals. In this way, demand for limiting government access to information imposes social costs. This article discusses the aspects of privacy that matter, including leaks, and explores certain countries’ public disclosure of taxpayer information. It then discusses what is known about, and the difficulties of ascertaining, how taxpayers value tax privacy, whether offering choices to taxpayers about information revelation can ease the tension between privacy and otherwise optimal tax policy, and uses the wealth tax as an example of the policy tradeoffs that arise.
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