深度一体化的政治经济学
The Political Economy of Deep Integration
Annual Review of Economics · 2021 · [{"name": "Giovanni Maggi", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "Yale University", "Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças"]}, {"name": "Ralph Ossa", "affiliation": ["Center for Economic and Policy Research", "University of Zurich", "Centre for Economic Policy Research"]}]
中文摘要
现代贸易协定不再强调基本的贸易自由化，而是更广泛地聚焦于国际政策协调。在本综述中，我们介绍关于此类深度一体化协定的政治经济学新兴文献。我们围绕三个主要方面展开讨论。第一，围绕贸易协定的政治冲突正超越经典的对立格局，即从贸易中获益的出口方利益与因贸易而受损的进口竞争方利益之间的对立。第二，与浅层一体化协定相比，深度一体化协定遭遇了更为强烈的民众反弹。最后，贸易协定的福利经济学变得更加复杂，即实现更自由贸易这一目标已不再足以作为评估国际协定效率的指南。
Abstract
Modern trade agreements no longer emphasize basic trade liberalization but instead focus on international policy coordination in a much broader sense. In this review we introduce the emerging literature on the political economy of such deep integration agreements. We organize our discussion around three main points. First, the political conflict surrounding trade agreements is moving beyond the classic antagonism of exporter interests who gain from trade and import-competing interests who lose from trade. Second, there is a more intense popular backlash against deep integration agreements than there was against shallow integration agreements. Finally, the welfare economics of trade agreements has become more complex, in the sense that the goal of achieving freer trade is no longer sufficient as a guide to evaluating the efficiency of international agreements.