保险市场的选择: 社会保险设计的庇古方法
Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design
Annual Review of Economics · 2021 · [{"name": "Nathaniel Hendren", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "Harvard University"]}, {"name": "Camille Landais", "affiliation": ["Centre for Economic Policy Research", "London School of Economics and Political Science"]}, {"name": "Johannes Spinnewijn", "affiliation": ["Centre for Economic Policy Research", "London School of Economics and Political Science"]}]
中文摘要
社会保险项目中是否应提供选择？本综述提出一个概念框架，用于识别决定提供选择之社会价值的关键力量。我们表明，个人对额外保险的估值差异越大，提供选择的价值越高，但基于风险的选择和基于道德风险的选择均会降低这一价值。除逆向选择外，基于选择的政策的实施还面临选择摩擦、或提供基本无偿护理义务等挑战。所有这些低效率均可视为外部性，它们并不能为不提供选择本身提供正当理由，而是指向了监管政策的必要性，并提示了庇古式矫正性定价的潜在价值。将这一框架应用于失业保险背景下关于这些力量的现有证据，我们发现，即使存在显著的逆向选择，提供保险选择仍可能具有价值。最后，我们说明该框架如何能够为不同保险领域的进一步实证研究提供富有成效的指导。
Abstract
Should choice be offered in social insurance programs? This review presents a conceptual framework that identifies the key forces determining the social value of offering choice. We show that the value of offering choice is higher the larger the variation in individual valuations for extra insurance is, but it gets reduced by both selection on risk and selection on moral hazard. Besides adverse selection, the implementation of choice-based policies is further challenged by the presence of choice frictions or the obligation to offer basic uncompensated care. All these inefficiencies can be seen as externalities that do not rationalize the absence of providing choice per se but point to the need for regulatory policies and suggest the potential value of corrective pricing à la Pigou. Applying this framework to the existing evidence on these forces in the context of unemployment insurance, we find that offering insurance choice can be valuable even in the presence of significant adverse selection. We conclude by showing how this framework can constitute a fruitful guide for further empirical research in different insurance domains.