选票交易能改善福利吗?
Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?
Annual Review of Economics · 2021 · [{"name": "Alessandra Casella", "affiliation": ["Columbia University"]}, {"name": "Antonin Macé", "affiliation": ["Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique", "Paris School of Economics"]}]
中文摘要
选民有强烈的激励通过交易选票来增加自身影响力：在偏好强烈时获取他人的选票，以换取在偏好较弱时出让自己的选票。但选票交易究竟是增进福利还是降低福利？对于一种长期以来被认为是集体决策核心的做法，缺乏明确答案令人意外。我们回顾了相关理论文献，并在可获得的情况下回顾其相关实验检验。我们首先分析"互投赞成票"（logrolling，即以选票换选票）。随后，我们聚焦于选票市场，即选票可与计价物进行交易。最后，我们讨论允许选民在不同决策之间转移选票的程序——即只允许一个人与自己交易选票。我们发现，选票交易和选票市场通常是低效的；而允许选民在不同决策之间分配选票，则能得到更令人鼓舞的结果。
Abstract
Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others’ votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare improving or welfare decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling, the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions—that is, allowing one to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions.