什么塑造了政府官员的质量与行为? 选拔与留任方法的制度差异
What Shapes the Quality and Behavior of Government Officials? Institutional Variation in Selection and Retention Methods
Annual Review of Economics · 2021 · [{"name": "Claire Lim", "affiliation": ["Queen Mary University of London", "Centre for Economic Policy Research"]}, {"name": "James M. Snyder", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "Harvard University"]}]
中文摘要
在代议制民主中，人们采用多种规则来选拔和留任公职人员，以反映公众对政策的偏好。我们综述了有关政府官员选拔与留任规则的文献，重点关注低信息职位。首先，我们概述了选拔与留任规则的历史起源及其差异范围。其次，我们提供了评估直接选举利弊的概念框架，并讨论了影响选举运作的各种因素。第三，我们呈现经验规律。我们总结了制度差异的基准效应，及其与媒体、薪酬等因素的交互作用。最后，我们讨论了理论和实证层面的未决问题，以及政府信息数字化和机器学习的进步如何为研究开辟新途径。
Abstract
In representative democracies, a variety of rules are employed to select and retain public officials to reflect public preferences over policies. We discuss the literature on selection and retention rules for government officials, focusing on low-information offices. First, we overview the historical origins and the scope of the variation in selection and retention rules. Second, we provide conceptual frameworks for assessing the advantages and disadvantages of direct elections and discuss various factors that influence the functioning of elections. Third, we present empirical regularities. We summarize the baseline effects of the institutional variation and their interaction with factors such as media and compensation. Finally, we discuss outstanding questions on theoretical and empirical fronts, and how the digitization of government information and advances in machine learning can open up new avenues for research.