Fostering Cooperation: The Conflict-Reducing Effects of Intervillage Competition for Government Transfers
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2026 · Teevrat Garg、Caterina Gennaioli、Stefania Lovo、Gregor Singer
中文摘要
本文考察印度尼西亚群体间竞争对群体内部暴力冲突的影响。采用三重差分设计, 我们发现, 村庄之间围绕国家政府转移支付的竞争越激烈, 村内冲突越少。无论竞争结果如何, 这些效应均持续存在; 在族群碎片化和隔离程度较高的村庄中更为明显, 并伴随着村民会议出席率的提高。我们的结果与如下观点一致: 外部竞争有利于原本分裂的社区内部的参与与合作, 这表明与外群体竞争的经济激励结合各种公民参与形式, 可能成为减少社区内部暴力的重要机制。(JEL D74, H70, O15, O17, O18, Z13)
Abstract
We examine the effect of intergroup competition on within-group violent conflict in Indonesia. Using a triple-differences design, we find that higher competition for national government transfers between villages reduces within-village conflict. These effects persist regardless of the competition’s outcome, are stronger in ethnically fractionalized and segregated villages, and are accompanied by higher attendance in village meetings. Our results are consistent with external competition favoring participation and cooperation within otherwise divided communities, suggesting that economic incentives to compete with out-groups combined with forms of civic engagement can be important mechanisms to reduce violence within communities. (JEL D74, H70, O15, O17, O18, Z13)