American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2026 · Kevin A. Bryan、Mitchell Hoffman、Amir Sariri
中文摘要
如果劳动者对企业质量有更多了解，他们是否会申请更好的企业？我们与26家科学型初创企业合作，创建了一个定制招聘网站，并邀请商学院校友前来申请。该招聘网站在申请者之间进行随机化，向其展示所有初创企业科学质量和/或商业模式质量的粗略专家评级。使评级可见会强烈地将申请重新配置到评级更高的企业。即便将样本限定为高质量劳动者，这种重新配置依然成立。处理在一定程度上通过改变劳动者对企业右尾结果的信念而发挥作用。尽管存在这些收益，劳动者在处理后的下注表明其对初创企业成功持高度过度乐观的信念，这提示存在更广泛的信息不足问题。（JEL D22, D83, J22, J23, J24, M13, M51）
Abstract
Would workers apply to better firms if they were more informed about firm quality? Collaborating with 26 science-based start-ups, we create a custom job board and invite business school alumni to apply. The job board randomizes across applicants to show coarse expert ratings of all start-ups' science and/or business model quality. Making ratings visible strongly reallocates applications toward higher-rated firms. This reallocation holds, restricting to high-quality workers. Treatments operate in part by shifting worker beliefs about firms' right-tail outcomes. Despite these benefits, workers make posttreatment bets indicating highly overoptimistic beliefs about start-up success, suggesting a problem of broader informational deficits. (JEL D22, D83, J22, J23, J24, M13, M51)