American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2026 · Girija Borker、Jan Eeckhout、Nancy Luke、Shantidani Minz、Kaivan Munshi、Soumya Swaminathan
中文摘要
为解释印度的性别选择，已有两种机制被提出：儿子偏好，即父母希望拥有男性继承人；以及女儿厌恶，即嫁妆支付使父母因养育女孩而境况更差。我们的模型同时纳入这两种机制，并基于婚姻制度的组织方式，为女儿厌恶提供了微观基础。在模型中，婚姻匹配、性别选择与嫁妆是共同决定的，其含义在一个具有代表性的农村家庭样本上得到检验。模型的模拟表明，现有针对女儿厌恶的政策可能会加剧这一问题，同时也识别出其他可能有效的政策。（JEL D31, G51, J12, J16, O12, O18, Z13）
Abstract
Two mechanisms have been proposed to explain sex selection in India: son preference, in which parents desire a male heir, and daughter aversion, in which dowry payments make parents worse off with girls. Our model incorporates both mechanisms, providing microfoundations, based on the organization of the marriage institution, for daughter aversion. Marital matching, sex selection, and dowries are jointly determined in the model, whose implications are tested on a representative sample of rural households. Simulations of the model indicate that existing policies targeting daughter aversion might exacerbate the problem, while identifying other policies that could be effective. (JEL D31, G51, J12, J16, O12, O18, Z13)