中文摘要
我们分析参照依赖偏好下的福利问题。我们将参照点变化与价格变化的一阶福利效应分解为直接效应与行为效应。这些效应的正负号取决于参照依赖收益的形式;哪些效应具有福利相关性,则取决于参照依赖是否反映一种偏差。我们以可估计的简化式参数和规范判断刻画相应的社会福利效应。我们将该框架应用于德国工人退休决策中的参照依赖。我们发现,正常退休年龄(NRA)的局部提高具有正的福利效应,而延迟退休的经济激励的效应则不明确。(JEL D91, H55, J26, J32)
Abstract
We analyze welfare under reference-dependent preferences. We decompose the first-order welfare effects of reference point and price changes into direct and behavioral effects. The sign of these effects depends on the form of reference-dependent payoffs; which effects are welfare relevant depends on whether reference dependence reflects a bias. We characterize corresponding social welfare effects in terms of estimable reduced-form parameters and normative judgments. We apply our framework to reference dependence in German workers’ retirement decisions. We find positive welfare effects of local increases in the normal retirement age (NRA) but ambiguous effects of financial incentives to postpone retirement. (JEL D91, H55, J26, J32)