我的税太高了: 家庭为何抗议税收?
My Taxes Are Too Darn High: Why Do Households Protest Their Taxes?
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 2020 · [{"name": "Brad Nathan", "affiliation": ["The University of Texas at Dallas"]}, {"name": "Ricardo Perez-Truglia", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "University of California, Berkeley"]}, {"name": "Alejandro Zentner", "affiliation": ["The University of Texas at Dallas"]}]
中文摘要
在美国及许多其他国家，纳税人可以提出异议以合法降低其财产税。尽管税务异议的做法被广泛采用，但相关研究却很少。为填补这一空白，我们利用行政记录数据，并结合两个因果识别来源——一项准实验和一项大规模自然实地实验——展开研究。我们记录了三个关键因素，用以解释为何有些纳税人提出异议而另一些人没有：预期节税额、申报摩擦以及公平性考量。与之相反，我们发现党派属性并不是一个显著因素。我们使用货币度量方法，计算了纳税人对公平性的支付意愿以及申报摩擦的大小。最后，我们讨论了建立更公平的税务申诉制度所蕴含的政策启示。NBER工作论文系列的机构订阅用户以及发展中国家居民，可在 www.nber.org 免费下载本文，无需支付额外费用。
Abstract
In the United States and many other countries, taxpayers can file a protest to legally reduce their property taxes. Despite the widespread use of tax protests, there is little research on them. To fill this gap, we use administrative records and two sources of causal identification: a quasi-experiment and a large-scale natural field experiment. We document three key factors explaining why some individuals file protests while others do not: expected tax savings, filing frictions, and fairness considerations. On the contrary, we show that partisanship is not a significant factor. We calculate the willingness to pay for fairness and the magnitude of filing frictions using a money metric. Last, we discuss policy implications for a more equitable system of tax appeals.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.