中文摘要
当一国主要出口资源被施加价格上限时，资源出口国的最优应对是什么？本文构建了一个纳入随机价格、金融摩擦与市场势力的动态框架，以研究这一新型治国工具。设计得当的价格上限可以激励增加开采，从而稳定全球市场价格。但当上限管制之外存在泄漏时，这种稳定效应会减弱。因此，政策执行不力会恶化实施制裁的政策制定者所面临的权衡取舍。我们提供了一种系统方法，用于在这些情况下设定并执行最优的价格上限水平。（JEL F12, F14, F51, L71, P28, P33, Q35）
Abstract
What is the optimal response of a resource exporter when a price cap is imposed on its main export? This paper develops a dynamic framework incorporating stochastic prices, financial frictions, and market power to study this novel tool of statecraft. With the right design, a price cap can incentivize increased extraction, stabilizing prices in the global market. But the stabilizing effects diminish when there is leakage outside the cap. Consequently, weak enforcement of the policy worsens the trade-off faced by the sanctioning policymaker. We provide a systematic approach to setting and enforcing an optimal cap level in these circumstances. (JEL F12, F14, F51, L71, P28, P33, Q35)