不可再生资源价格上限理论
A Theory of Price Caps on Non-Renewable Resources
American Economic Review · 2023 · [{"name": "Simon Johnson", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "International Paper (United States)", "University College London", "Massachusetts Institute of Technology", "University of California, Berkeley"]}, {"name": "Lukasz Rachel", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "International Paper (United States)", "University College London", "Massachusetts Institute of Technology", "University of California, Berkeley"]}, {"name": "Catherine Wolfram", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "International Paper (United States)", "University College London", "Massachusetts Institute of Technology", "University of California, Berkeley"]}]
中文摘要
当资源出口国的主要出口产品被施加价格上限时，其最优应对是什么？本文构建了一个纳入随机价格、金融摩擦和市场势力的动态框架，以研究这一新型治国工具。设计得当的价格上限可以激励增加开采，从而稳定全球市场价格。但当上限之外存在泄漏时，这一稳定效应会减弱。因此，政策执行不力会恶化实施制裁的政策制定者所面临的权衡。我们提供了一种系统方法，用以在此类情形下设定并执行最优上限水平。（JEL F12, F14, F51, L71, P28, P33, Q35）
Abstract
What is the optimal response of a resource exporter when a price cap is imposed on its main export? This paper develops a dynamic framework incorporating stochastic prices, financial frictions, and market power to study this novel tool of statecraft. With the right design, a price cap can incentivize increased extraction, stabilizing prices in the global market. But the stabilizing effects diminish when there is leakage outside the cap. Consequently, weak enforcement of the policy worsens the trade-off faced by the sanctioning policymaker. We provide a systematic approach to setting and enforcing an optimal cap level in these circumstances. (JEL F12, F14, F51, L71, P28, P33, Q35)