American Economic Review · 2023 · Hassan Afrouzi、Marina Halac、Kenneth Rogoff、Pierre Yared
中文摘要
本文研究中央银行信誉对长期通胀及通胀动态的影响。我们在一个标准的非线性新凯恩斯经济模型中引入中央银行缺乏承诺这一因素，该模型包含具有粘性价格、垄断竞争性质的企业。通胀由缺乏承诺与经济环境之间的相互作用所驱动。我们表明，劳动楔子出现未预期的永久性上升，或不同品种之间的替代弹性下降，均会导致长期通胀上升。在转轨过程中，通胀先超调，随后逐渐回落。定量分析表明，通胀超调具有持续性，且相对于通胀目标制，缺乏承诺所造成的福利损失较大。（JEL D43, E12, E23, E24, E31, E52, E58）
Abstract
This paper studies the implications of central bank credibility for long-run inflation and inflation dynamics. We introduce central bank lack of commitment into a standard nonlinear New Keynesian economy with sticky-price monopolistically competitive firms. Inflation is driven by the interaction of lack of commitment and the economic environment. We show that long-run inflation increases following an unanticipated permanent increase in the labor wedge or decrease in the elasticity of substitution across varieties. In the transition, inflation overshoots and then gradually declines. Quantitatively, inflation overshooting is persistent, and the welfare loss from lack of commitment relative to inflation targeting is large. (JEL D43, E12, E23, E24, E31, E52, E58)