无承诺的货币政策

American Economic Review · 2023 · [{"name": "Hassan Afrouzi", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "Harvard University Press", "Yale University", "Columbia University"]}, {"name": "Marina Halac", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "Harvard University Press", "Yale University", "Columbia University"]}, {"name": "Kenneth Rogoff", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "Harvard University Press", "Yale University", "Columbia University"]}, {"name": "Pierre Yared", "affiliation": ["National Bureau of Economic Research", "Harvard University Press", "Yale University", "Columbia University"]}]

中文摘要

本文研究中央银行可信度对长期通货膨胀及通货膨胀动态的影响。我们将中央银行缺乏承诺引入一个标准的非线性新凯恩斯经济体，其中企业具有价格粘性并处于垄断竞争。通货膨胀由缺乏承诺与经济环境之间的相互作用所驱动。我们表明，在劳动楔子出现未预期的永久性上升，或不同品种之间替代弹性下降之后，长期通货膨胀会上升。在转轨过程中，通货膨胀会超调，随后逐步下降。定量而言，通货膨胀超调具有持续性，且相对于通货膨胀目标制，缺乏承诺造成的福利损失较大。（JEL D43, E12, E23, E24, E31, E52, E58）

Abstract

This paper studies the implications of central bank credibility for long-run inflation and inflation dynamics. We introduce central bank lack of commitment into a standard nonlinear New Keynesian economy with sticky-price monopolistically competitive firms. Inflation is driven by the interaction of lack of commitment and the economic environment. We show that long-run inflation increases following an unanticipated permanent increase in the labor wedge or decrease in the elasticity of substitution across varieties. In the transition, inflation overshoots and then gradually declines. Quantitatively, inflation overshooting is persistent, and the welfare loss from lack of commitment relative to inflation targeting is large. (JEL D43, E12, E23, E24, E31, E52, E58)